Professor	
  David	
  L.	
  VanderZwaag	
  
Canada	
  Research	
  Chair	
  in	
  	
  
Ocean	
  Law	
  and	
  Governance	
  
Marine	
  &	
  Environmental	
  Law	
  Institute	
  
Schulich	
  School	
  of	
  Law	
  
Dalhousie	
  University	
  
	
  
	
  
ShipArc	
  2015	
  
Safe	
  and	
  Sustainable	
  Shipping	
  in	
  a	
  	
  
Changing	
  Arctic	
  Environment	
  
	
  
World	
  Maritime	
  University	
  
Malmo,	
  Sweden	
  
August	
  25-‐27,	
  2015	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

Introduction
●Three words help capture the present state of Arctic Ocean governance
1.Conflict – Jurisdictional disputes still hover over parts of the Arctic
2.Cooperation – Numerous cooperative agreements and arrangements have
been forged at the bilateral, regional and global levels
3.Challenges – A sea of ocean governance challenges still confronts the
region, e.g.,
+Sorting out future governance arrangements
for the central Arctic Ocean (CAO) beyond
national jurisdiction
+Identifying and protecting areas of heightened
ecological and cultural significance
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 A three-part “speed cruise” follows
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1. Conflict
Four key jurisdictional tensions relevant to shipping hover over the
Arctic
(i) Legal status of the Northwest Passage
●Canada maintains the NWP consists of internal waters
+Drew straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago,
effective January 1, 1986 (full national sovereignty over the internal
waters enclosed)
+Has unilaterally established “zero
pollution” standards for oil, garbage
and waste disposals from Arctic
shipping pursuant to the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act
+Has imposed special construction,
(Roach and Smith 1996)
design, equipment and crewing standards
4

+

+

Two main legal foundations for internal waters status
‒
Historic waters (subject to Canadian exclusive control over many
years with the aquiescience of other States to the exclusive
authority)
‒
Waters within straight baselines drawn around a “fringe of islands”
along the coast
Two main arguments can be made against the Canadian drawing of
straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago
‒
The islands are not in the “immediate vicinity”
of the coastline as required by Art. 7(1) of
the UN Law of the Sea Convention
‒
The drawing of straight baselines “must not
depart to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast” (Art. 7(3))
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●

+

U.S. legal stance – NWP is an international strait subject to the right of
transit passage by foreign ships
Transit passage substantially limits controls a coastal State like
Canada could impose on foreign ships navigating through strait waters
‒
Coastal State cannot impose its own pollution control or safety at
sea standards (international standards apply) (Art. 39)
‒
Coastal State can designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic
separation schemes for navigation where necessary to promote the
safe passage of ships but IMO approval is required (Art. 41)
‒
Coastal State cannot prohibit foreign ship transits because of risky
cargoes, such as hazardous or radioactive wastes
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+ Considerable debate exists over whether the Northwest Passage

has become a “strait used for international navigation”
‒

Little question that Northwest Passage meets the geographic
condition set out by the Law of the Sea Convention (Art. 37)
(Connecting one part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone with another part of the high seas or
an EEZ)

‒

Big issue is what constitutes the legal litmus for navigational usage
Potential vs. actual usage
Volume of traffic required
Number of different flagged
vessel transits
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(ii) Tensions over the extent of special legislative and enforcement powers
bestowed on coastal States by Article 234 of the Law of the Sea
Convention over ice-covered waters
● Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce
non- discriminatory laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within
the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where
particularly severe climate conditions and the
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the
year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
Such laws and regulations shall have due regard
to navigation and the protection and preservation
of the marine environment based on the best
available scientific evidence. (emphasis added) 8

● Various issues continue to surround the practical implementation of

Article 234
+ What exactly does ice-covered waters for “most of the year” mean?
+ Is the Article applicable to an ice-covered strait used for international
navigation?
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+ Can Article 234 be used to justify unilateral coastal State imposition of

ship reporting and possibly routeing measures?
– Effective 1 July 2010 Canada imposed mandatory reporting
requirements for certain classes of vessels preparing to navigate within
the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone which
covers the Shipping Safety Control Zones and other northern waters
such as Hudson and James Bay
*

Vessel coverages
> Vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more
> Vessels engaged in towing or pushing
another vessel if the combined gross
tonnage of the vessel and the vessel
being towed or pushed is 500 gross tonnage or more
> Vessels carrying as a cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods or
engaged in towing or pushing a vessel with such a cargo
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– A tussle, led by the United States, ensued within the IMO
*

U.S. questioning whether Canada’s NORDREG system was in
compliance with SOLAS, chapter V requirements
> Canada should have worked through the IMO for formal approval
> A vessel traffic services (VTS) zone may only be made mandatory
within the territorial sea of a coastal State
> Not clear that NORDREG gives “due regard to navigation”
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– Canada responded in a very “diplomatic fashion”
*

Submitted an explanatory document of its own
> Clarifying Canada’s reliance on Art. 234 for its unilateral imposition
of NORDREG
> Noting that foreign sovereign immune vessels would be requested to
voluntarily comply with NORDREG
> Requested IMO to bring the NORDREG
system to the attention of member
Governments which in fact occurred
through an IMO information circular
(SN.1/Circ. 291, 5 October 2010)
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(iii) Beaufort Sea boundary between Canada and the United States
+Canada claims the 141st meridian as the Beaufort Sea boundary
- Based upon 1825 Great Britain-Russia Treaty
- Boundary language of the Treaty refers to the meridian line “in its
prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean”
+US argues an equidistance line should apply
- Based upon customary international law relating to maritime
boundary delimitation
- Views the 1825 Treaty as only
delimiting the land boundary
+Some 6250 square NM in dispute
+Not clear which country has
jurisdiction over shipping activities
in the disputed area

(Gray 1997)
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(iv) Legal status of straits within the Northern Sea Route
+The United States also contests Russia’s claim to internal waters status of
the Vilkitski, Shokalski, Dmitri Laptev and Sannikov Straits and the drawing
of straight baselines around the associated island groups

(Lalonde and Lasserre 2014)
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2. Cooperation
Substantial cooperation has occurred at the bilateral, regional and global
levels
(i) Bilateral
Two quick examples
● Canada - USA
+ Joint Marine Contingency
Plan for the Beaufort Sea
(CANUSNORTH, latest
revision 2013)
+ North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) which extended

cooperative surveillance to the maritime domain in May 2006
+ Informal moratorium on petroleum exploration/exploitation in the disputed
zone
15

+

In 1988 Canada and the United States reached a “stalemate” Agreement
on Arctic Cooperation
‒ Parties agreed to set aside their jurisdictional dispute over the legal
status of the Passage by “agreeing to disagree”
‒ United States agreed that its icebreakers would be subject to Canadian
consent for transits within waters claimed by Canada to be internal
‒ Countries agreed to share research information regarding the marine
environment gained through icebreaker navigation
‒ Clear that commercial and naval vessels not included
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● Norway – Russian Federation
+ Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and

the Arctic Ocean (2010)
‒ Boundary dispute festered for over 30 years with
Russia arguing for a sector line and Norway
relying on a median line
‒ Agreement essentially split the difference and
includes provisions on future cooperation
concerning fisheries and possible overlapping
hydrocarbon deposits
* Parties agree to apply the precautionary approach
to the management of shared fish stocks and to
continue setting total allowable catches, quotas
and other regulatory measures through the
Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission
* Parties agree to negotiate a unitization agreement
in case of a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit

http://www.fni.no/news/newspics/delelinje200.jpg
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(ii) Regional
Two main routes for regional cooperation
●Arctic Council and its “progeny”
+The Arctic Council, established pursuant to
a non-legally binding Declaration adopted in
Ottawa on 19 September 1996, has become
the main institutional vehicle for furthering
regional cooperation
– Eight Arctic States included as members
* Canada
* Norway
* Denmark/Greenland
* Russian Federation
* Finland
* Sweden
* Iceland
* United States of America
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– Indigenous organizations (now six in number) elevated to status of

Permanent Participants
* Aleut International Association
* Arctic Athabaskan Council
* Gwich’in Council International
* Innuit Circumpolar Council
* Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North (RAIPON)
* Saami Council

– Six Working Groups established
*
*
*
*
*
*

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR)
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) (1998)
Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) (2006)
19

– Rotating chairship among Arctic States (every two years)
– Ministerial meetings on a biennial basis
– Observer status open to
*

*
*

Non-Arctic States
> First observer states were France, Germany,
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United
Kingdom
> China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and
South Korea added in May 2013
Inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations
Non-governmental organizations

– Overall objective is to promote cooperation on common Arctic issues, in

particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection
– Substantial limitations in governance
* Largely a “talk and study” forum
* Cannot address military and security issues
* No powers to directly develop regional environmental standards, e.g., for
20
oil and gas exploration/development

+ Two regional agreements have been negotiated by Arctic Council task

forces
‒ Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement
* Agreed to at the May 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting
* Delineates areas of national search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities
in the Arctic
* Calls for further cooperation in joint exercises and training
* Provides for expedited cooperative national responses to SAR
incidents
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‒ Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and

Response (2013)
* Pledges Parties to maintain effective national oil pollution
preparedness response systems
* Calls for cooperation in response operations
* Promotes joint exercises and training
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+ Arctic Economic Council (AEC)
‒ Established as an independent organization under Canada’s

chairship of the Arctic Council.
‒ Comprised of up to 42 business representatives appointed by the
eight Arctic States and Permanent Participants
‒ Tasked with facilitating business opportunities and responsible
economic development in the Arctic
‒ Includes various shipping interests, e.g.,
* Arctia Shipping Ltd. (Finland)
* Danish Shipowners’ Association
* Norwegian Shipowners’ Association
* SOVCOMFLOT (Russian Federation)
‒ Has met twice (September 2-3, 2014 and April 23, 2015)	
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 Regional cooperative efforts by the five Arctic coastal States (Arctic 5)
+ 1973 Polar Bear Conservation Agreement

Five States having polar bears (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway,
Russian Federation, USA) agree
‒ To protect polar bear dens and ecosystems
‒ To prohibit takings with few exceptions
*
*
*

Subsistence hunting
“Self-defence” to save
human life
Scientific purposes
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+ Arctic 5 Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas

Fishing in the CAO
‒ Adopted on July 16, 2015 in Oslo, Norway
‒ States agreed to various interim measures to address potential
commercial fishing in the high seas of the CAO
* Not authorizing fishing vessels to conduct fishing in the high seas area
until one or more regional or subregional fisheries management
organizations or arrangements have established management measures
* Establishing a joint scientific research program to promote ecosystem
understandings
* Coordinating monitoring, control and surveillance activities
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+ Establishment of a new Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission

(ARHC)
‒ To facilitate cooperation in undertaking surveys and enhancing
nautical charting
‒ Members include Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, USA
‒ Has met on an annual basis (1st meeting in October 2010)
Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission (ARHC) Commission hydrographique régionale de l'Arctique (CHRA)
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(iii) Global
Arctic-related cooperation fostered primarily through
Various multilateral environmental agreements
IMO’s Polar Shipping Code (just covered)
World-Wide Navigational Warning Service
+Cooperative effort of IMO and the International Hydrographic Organization
+Globe divided into 21 regions called “NAVAREAS” where countries are
charged with collecting and issuing navigational warnings through the Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)
+Five NAVAREAS in the Arctic
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3. Challenges
Because of time constraints, only a “swift six” will be flagged
(i) Sorting out future governance arrangements for the CAO
Arctic 5 Declaration on CAO Fishing (July 2015) is only a “starting point”
+Still need to bring other interested States on board
+Still need to flesh out a scientific cooperation program
+Still need to operationalize cooperation in maritime monitoring, control and
surveillance
●Arctic States have yet to agree on whether, and if so, how to take actions
within the IMO to address future shipping activities in the CAO
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+ A 2014 report for PAME on Specially Designated Marine

Areas in the Arctic High Seas set out various options such as
‒ Designating the entire high seas as a PSSA with associated
protective measures including vessel traffic and ship
reporting systems
‒ Establishing one or more PSSAs for “core ice areas” with
area to be avoided status
+ At PAME’s September 2014 meeting, a decision was reached to take a
number of interim steps before pursuing actions within the IMO including
‒ A paper investigating the possibility for IMO to designate a PSSA located
entirely on the high seas
‒ A paper exploring whether dynamic areas to be avoided might be
established
‒ Papers have yet to be written
+ At PAME’s February 2015 meeting, PAME invited AMAP and CAFF to
denote high sea areas of the CAO particularly vulnerable to international
shipping activities
29

(ii) Identifying and protecting areas of heightened ecological and
cultural significance in national waters
●The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine

Shipping Assessment (AMSA 2009)
flagged this as a key challenge
+Arctic States urged to conduct surveys on Arctic marine use by indigenous

communities (Recommendation II.A)
+Arctic States encouraged to ensure effective coordination mechanisms are
in place to engage coastal communities in helping to reduce the impacts from
shipping (Recommendation II.B)
+Arctic States urged to identify areas of heightened ecological and cultural
significance and to take protective measures (Recommendation II.C)
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● Some progress has been made in identifying significant marine areas with

a 2013 report prepared by three of the Arctic Council’s working groups

+ Identified a total of about 97 areas of heightened ecological significance

comprising more than half of the ice-covered part of the marine Arctic
+ Admitted the lack of details on areas of heightened cultural significance
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● Protective routeing measures through the IMO for environmental

purposes are very limited in Arctic waters
+ Off Northern Norway
‒ Traffic separation schemes and recommended routes established
through IMO effective on 1 July 2007
‒ Tankers of all sizes and other cargo ships of 5000 gross tonnage
and over engaged in international voyages are encouraged to
navigate about 30 nautical miles from land

Source: COLREG. 2/Circ. 58 (2006)
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+ Vessel routeings off Alaska

‒ Five recommendatory areas to be avoided off the Aleutian Islands
* Applicable to ships 400 gross tonnage and above on international
voyages
* Providing 50 NM buffer zones
* Approved by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee at its 95th
session in June 2015
* Measures take effect on January 1, 2016
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(iii) Working out future directions for the Arctic Council
Lots of lingering issues, e.g.,
+How might the engagement of non-Arctic States be strengthened?
+How might financing of Arctic Council activities be enhanced?
‒ Secure funding for Permanent Participant involvements
‒ Adequate funding for Council projects and assessments
+Should additional regional agreements be negotiated? e.g.,
‒ Framework treaty further formalizing the Arctic Council

and national commitments
‒ Agreement on offshore oil and gas operational standards
+How might the “Arctic voice” be better communicated in international

fora?
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 Some promising avenues from the Arctic Council’s Iqaluit Declaration of

April 24, 2015
+ Has tasked Senior Arctic Officials with providing further guidance on
engaging with Observers
+ Commits to identifying new approaches to funding Permanent Participants
+ Decision taken to establish a Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation to
consider possible ways forward for
enhancing cooperation including
through a regional seas program
+ Directed the Scientific Cooperation
Task Force to work towards
completing a legally-binding
agreement on scientific cooperation
by the 2017 Ministerial meeting
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(iv) Conserving Arctic migratory bird populations
 A long neglected issue
+ At least 279 bird species from outside the Arctic take advantage of the

highly productive summer breeding seasons
+ The Arctic hosts some 80% of the global goose populations
● CAFF Working Group still in the early stages of carrying out priority
actions under its Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative (AMBI) to strengthen
conservation efforts in the four main flyways of the world
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(v) Establishing a regional network of MPAs
The latest Arctic Council initiative to promote the

establishment of an MPA network suggests a long
voyage is ahead in moving from paper to practice
PAME’s Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of
Marine Protected Areas stands out as being
“politically cautious”
+No regional target adopted for MPA designations
+Leaving priorities and timelines for possible
additions of MPAs to each Arctic State
+Administrative details yet to be worked out
●Further “paper steps” promised in PAME’s
Workplan 2015-2017
+Updated inventory of existing Arctic MPAs
+Desktop study on area-based conservation measures
in the Arctic
37

(vi) Further addressing vessel-source
marine pollution issues (Navigating beyond
the Polar Code), e.g.,
 Ensuring effective ballast water management
in polar waters
 Considering further heavy fuel oil (HFO)
bans
 Controlling black carbon emissions
 Possibly designating one or more Emission
Control Areas (ECAs) in the Arctic
- Areas where more stringent air pollution
controls for SOx, NOx and particulate
matter might be imposed
- An Emission Control Area has already
been established for sea areas off the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada and
the U.S.

General view of the North American Emission Control Area
(IMO, MEPC.1/Circ. 723, Annex 1, p. 7, 2010)
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Conclusion
 Many other challenges relating to Arctic shipping governance hover on

the horizon but no time to cover
+ Ensuring sustainable marine tourism development in the Arctic
+ Further addressing noise pollution from ships
+ Delineating extended continental shelf boundaries in the Arctic
+ Ensuring adequate infrastructure to support safe and sustainable northern

shipping
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 One final nautical image captures the “bottom line” regarding

law of the sea and ocean governance in the Arctic
 An unfinished voyage!
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